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The International Trade Commission (ITC) has gained importance in recent years 
because of its increasingly powerful role in adjudicating patent disputes. That little-known 
independent agency has the authority to bar importation of articles found to infringe a valid U.S. 
patent by issuing exclusion orders. The Commission is now potentially the patent tribunal of first 
instance for electronic products and other products manufactured overseas. This paper examines 
possible biases in ITC decision making in favor of patent holders from both a positive and a 
normative perspective and offers suggestions for improving the efficiency of the ITC process for 
adjudicating complaints based on patent infringement. I provide the most comprehensive 
economic analysis to date of cases that arise under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In 
particular, this is the first paper to compare the ITC decision-making process in patent disputes 
with the district courts in a systematic way. After empirically demonstrating a likely bias in 
decision making at the ITC, the paper provides specific remedies that could improve the 
efficiency of the patent dispute process. 
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Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: 
A Review of International Trade Commission Decisions 
 




The International Trade Commission (ITC)—one of the two venues in which a firm can 
enforce its U.S. patent rights—offers patent holders nearly automatic injunctive relief if it finds 
infringement. Yet an important new strand of literature demonstrates that awarding injunctive 
relief to patent holders, even when their patents are infringed, often is not consistent with the 
socially optimal result (see Lemley and Shapiro forthcoming). In particular, when the patent 
covers a small component of an end product or when the patent holder is a non-practicing entity 
(“NPE”), the award of—or even the threat of—injunctive relief can lead to settlements at inflated 
royalty rates that are passed on to end users in the form of higher prices. In these cases, monetary 
fines or reasonable royalty rates will typically be better than injunctions for improving economic 
efficiency.  
This paper provides an empirical examination of ITC litigation of patent disputes. The issue 
is important because the ITC, which has jurisdiction to hear patent disputes under Section 337 of 
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (“Section 337”), has grown in popularity as a patent 
litigation venue in the recent past. In the 1990s, the average number of patent cases filed at the 
ITC was ten per year. Since 2000, the patent caseload at the ITC has doubled to on average 22 
per year. Figure 1 shows the number of Section 337 cases alleging patent infringement by year.  
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Figure 1: 
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Source: International Trade Commission website. 
Note: The number of 2006 cases is projected to the end of the year based on data through September 2006 by 
multiplying September figures by 1.33.  
The ITC has assumed an increasingly prominent role in adjudicating patent disputes in recent 
years, and the Commission is now an attractive venue for patent cases involving electronic 
products, since electronics are primarily manufactured overseas. Based on a review of the ITC’s 
337 database, other important industries that appear to be affected by the ITC’s role in patent law 
include computers, semiconductors, and communications systems. Three “high technology” 
sectors of the economy that are highly dependent on intellectual property and have been 
implicated by recent ITC patent cases—(1) computer and electronic products, (2) electrical 
equipment, appliances, and components, and (3) telecommunications—contributed nearly half a 
trillion dollars to U.S. gross domestic product in 2005 (Gross Domestic Product By Industry 
Accounts 2006). Although the number of actual 337 cases at the ITC in any given year may be 
small relative to the number of patent cases in district courts, a single ITC case, such as the 
recent case brought by Broadcom against Qualcomm involving chips used in handsets for cellular 
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telephones (Case No. 337-TA-543), can have far-reaching impacts for an entire industry.
1 
Moreover, if the ITC becomes a safe haven for patent trolls, then the number of cases could 
increase significantly, further adding to the social costs of the patent resolution process. 
Some legal practitioners argue that the ITC has become (or always has been) a venue that 
favors patent holders for several reasons (see Schwartz 2002). First, jurisdiction under Section 
337 derives from the mere act of importation, which eliminates wrangling over complex 
jurisdiction and venue issues that are common in district court proceedings. Second, ITC 
procedures sharply limit the time available for discovery, and the ITC therefore usually resolves 
cases more quickly than district courts (though the ITC’s advantage in this regard can be 
exaggerated).
2  Third, it has been argued that, in cases involving process patents, certain defenses 
that are available in district court are not available at the ITC (Sweetland and McManus 2006; 
see also Kinik Co. v. United States (362 F.3d 1359 Fed. Cir. [2004])), though that argument may 
be hard to square with the terms of Section 337(c), which provides that a respondent in an ITC 
complaint proceeding may raise “[a]ll legal and equitable defenses.” (19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)). 
The perception that patent holders hold an advantage at the ITC is reinforced by the 
observation that patent holders are more likely to win their cases at the ITC than in district court.  
Between 1975 and 1988, the complainant prevailed—that is, achieved a favorable decision by 
the ITC or a settlement—in 75 percent of patent cases brought before the ITC, compared with a 
40 to 45 percent win rate for patent plaintiffs in federal district courts (Aoki and Prusa 1993).
3 In 
more recent years, the ITC “has decided 54 percent of contested cases in favor of the patent 
holder. This compares positively with win rates for district court patent cases.” (Sweetland and 
McManus 2006). 
Furthermore, a patent holder at the ITC has substantial leverage over an alleged infringer 
when negotiating a settlement. The sole remedies available to the ITC are injunctive in nature—
that is, exclusion orders that ban the importation of infringing products, and cease-and-desist 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Wall Street Journal 2006. (noting that “[d]epending on how the cases are ultimately decided, 
millions of cell phones could be barred from the U.S. market at a cost to the phone makers and network operators of 
billions of dollars.”).
    
2 Limiting discovery time systematically favors complainants, who are able to prepare their case and develop 
evidence before filing a complaint. A respondent surprised by a complaint will have little time to develop and 
prepare a defense.  
3 I use whole number percentages throughout the paper.
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orders that bar the continued sale of imported articles.
4 In contrast, district courts do not have to 
issue an injunction to remedy infringement. They can impose monetary damages or establish a 
reasonable royalty or both. As described below, in the absence of alternative remedies, the ITC is 
extremely likely to issue injunctive relief following a finding of infringement. The virtual 
certainty that injunctive relief will be issued is a major source of potential bias favoring 
complainants. 
A key objective of this paper is to determine whether the ITC is a “biased” venue for 
resolving patent disputes. I define a “biased” venue for resolving patent disputes as one in which 
the average outcome across all decisions in that venue does not equal the mean outcome of an 
efficient system. By contrast, in an unbiased venue, while any particular decision may be 
incorrect, the average across all decisions is equal to the mean outcome of an efficient system. 
To make matters concrete, assume that, conditional on a large set of cases, the average win rate 
for plaintiffs, however defined, in an efficient system is 20 percent. If the average win rate for 
plaintiffs in a given venue is 40 percent, then one would conclude that the venue is biased in 
favor of plaintiffs. 
To determine whether a particular venue is biased, one needs to compare it against a 
benchmark. If one chooses an inappropriate benchmark, the comparison could lead to 
meaningless or misleading results. Here, I choose to use outcomes in district courts as the 
benchmark against which to compare ITC decision-making on the basis that district court 
decisions in patent cases are likely to be less biased than those at the ITC as a matter of theory.  
In addition to the three institutional advantages the ITC affords plaintiffs described above, 
there is a theoretical basis for believing that the ITC may be biased in its decision making—
namely, the ITC was designed to protect domestic manufacturers (see Anderson 1993).
5 As an 
independent federal agency, the ITC is exposed to political pressure from congressmen that 
                                                 
4 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (exclusion orders); id. § 1337(f) (cease and desist orders). The ITC can issue two types of 
exclusion orders. The first, known as a “limited” exclusion order, authorizes the ITC to block importation by a 
specific person who has been shown to have violated Section 337. See id. § 1337(d)(1). The second, known as a 
“general” exclusion order, authorizes the ITC to bar importation of a class of articles, but only when “necessary to 
prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products of named persons” or “there is a pattern of violation 
of this section and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products.” Id. § 1337(d)(2). In practice, the ITC 
sometimes uses limited exclusion orders to bar importation of a class of products. Even though the statute refers to 
“persons” who violate Section 337, the agency treats the remedy as “in rem”—against the products. 
5 “[T]he ITC differs from other agencies in that its statute directs it to focus solely on the effects on the competing 
domestic industry, rather than balancing the effects on consumers and producers as other agencies are directed to 
do.” 
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control the agency’s budget.
6 Because congressmen care about political costs and benefits rather 
than economic costs and benefits (see Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971), one would expect that 
congressional influence on the ITC would favor domestic firms seeking to enforce their patents 
against foreign rivals, as domestic firms are better able to provide political benefits than foreign 
firms. In fact, prior empirical research focusing on the ITC’s role in imposing antidumping duties 
suggests that the ITC is influenced by political factors.
7 Likewise, the win rate for plaintiffs at 
the ITC is highest when a domestic plaintiff is suing a foreign defendant, and the loss rate at the 
ITC for plaintiffs is highest when a foreign plaintiff is suing a domestic defendant, suggesting 
favoritism toward domestic litigants.
8
By contrast, district courts are not exposed to the same sort of direct political pressures on a 
given matter. Although district court judges are appointed by presidents and confirmed by the 
Senate, they have life-time tenure and are not beholden to individual politicians after their 
appointment. It is, of course, possible that district courts are still affected by preferences of juries 
or interest groups in a number of ways. For example, court decisions may be affected by the 
confirmation process itself, by their insulation from the politics that allows judges to pursue 
other agendas, or by asymmetries in litigation power between parties (see Elhauge 1991 arguing 
that the litigation process is not necessarily less susceptible to interest group pressures than the 
political process). Incompetence on behalf of district court judges with respect to patent expertise 
could also affect outcomes. One would not, however, expect these factors to lead to district court 
being systematically biased in favor of plaintiffs over defendants in patent cases or vice-versa, 
                                                 
6 Liebman (2001) notes that previous research suggests that congressional influence “stems . . . from its control over 
the agency’s budget.” Congressional influence might also stem from its role in appointing commissioners, but prior 
empirical work shows that this is a less important factor than congressional control of the budget.  
7 See, for example, Baldwin and Steagall (1994) finding that employment levels affect ITC decision-making and 
suggesting this indicates political bias; DeVault (1993) finding that the size of domestic industry has a significant 
effect on ITC decisions; Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) finding that international political considerations do not 
influence ITC decisions, but that domestic ones—such as an industry’s size—do; Hasen and Prusa (1997) finding 
that House trade committee members influence ITC decision-making and that PAC contributions influence 
outcomes; Herander and Schwartz (1984) using the number of firms in an industry as a proxy for lobbying strength 
and finding a strong correlation between this variable and ITC outcomes; Liebman (2001, p. 24) finding that Senate 
Trade subcommittee members “exert pressure on ITC commissioners to protect industries in their home states,” 
while finding that House Trade subcommittee members do not; Moore (1992, pp. 449, 460, 465) finding that the 
Senate Subcommittee on trade has a significant influence on ITC decisions. But see Anderson (1993 p. 928) finding 
political variables to not be significant determinants of ITC decision-making. 
8 I base this conclusion on my own analysis of the database of all ITC cases. I find that plaintiffs win in 26 percent 
of domestic-versus-foreign cases, while winning in only 21 percent of domestic-versus-domestic cases, 15 percent 
of foreign-versus-foreign cases, and 0 percent of foreign-versus-domestic cases. (See part 4.1.1, infra). 
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unlike with the type of bias at the ITC. Thus, as a starting point, it is reasonable to use outcomes 
at district courts as a benchmark for comparison with ITC outcomes. After finding what appears 
to be a bias in favor of complainants at the ITC vis-à-vis the district courts based on a simple 
difference in win rates at the two patent venues, I subject the hypothesis of a pro-complainant 
bias at the ITC to further tests, including tests of selection bias. These additional tests support my 
initial finding of bias in favor of complainants. 
The paper is organized as follows. Part 2 reviews the empirical literature examining the 
Section 337 process and the theoretical literature on optimal patent protection. One theme in the 
empirical literature is that ITC cases are different from cases brought to the district courts, which 
creates complications when comparing outcomes in the two venues. This problem can be 
characterized as one of “selection bias”—that is, it is possible that different types of cases are 
brought to the ITC than are brought to a district court—and I revisit this selection bias issue in a 
later section. I then summarize the economic theory of hold-up and identify two conditions under 
which injunctive relief for patent violations may not be consistent with the public interest. 
Specifically, injunctive relief may be inefficient (1) when the product that would be affected 
contains multiple components, of which only one is the subject of the patent suit, or (2) when the 
patentee is an NPE that asserts its patent after the accused infringer has sunk substantial costs 
into design, development, and commercialization of the accused product.  
In Part 3, I assess three purported benefits of Section 337 investigations: protectionism, speed 
in resolving patent disputes, and supplementing the district court’s jurisdiction. Of the three 
purported benefits, I conclude that in practice only the third benefit would tend to justify 
maintaining an ITC remedy distinct from the remedies available in district courts. 
In Part 4, I present new results on biases in Section 337 investigations in favor of 
complainants using the most comprehensive economic analysis to date of cases that arise under 
Section 337. I find evidence that the ITC favors patent holders vis-à-vis district courts by a wide 
margin. Patent holders are more likely to obtain a finding of infringement at the ITC than in 
district court. Of course, benchmarking against the district court could be problematic if the 
district court were itself biased, which could undermine the hypothesis that the ITC is biased in 
favor of complainants depending on the direction of the bias at the district court and the relative 
strength of the bias at the two patent venues. In addition, the simple difference in win rates across the two 
patent venues could be the result of selection issues. To control for this possibility, I perform two 
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analyses. First, I demonstrate that ITC decisions in favor of patent holders are much more likely 
to be reversed as erroneous than district court judgments. This finding supports the initial 
inference that the ITC is biased in favor of complainants implied by the difference in win rates. 
Second, I identified 32 parallel patent cases that were instituted in both district court and in the 
ITC. I find that an ITC decision in favor of the complainant resulted in the same outcome in a 
parallel case in a district court 55 percent of the time, whereas an ITC decision in favor of the 
respondent resulted in the same outcome in a parallel case in a district court 64 percent of the 
time. When the ITC rules in favor a plaintiff, the likelihood that the district court agrees with the 
ITC’s decision is not much better than chance. This suggests that the ITC may deviate from the 
district court’s standards when it rules in favor of a plaintiff. When two additional cases that 
resulted in settlements at the ITC, but rulings in favor of respondents at the district court are 
considered reversals of ITC decisions in favor of complainants, the survival rate for such pro-
complainant decisions falls from 55 percent to 46 percent (six cases out of thirteen cases), further 
increasing the disparity in survival rates between ITC decisions in favor of complainants (46 
percent) and ITC decisions in favor of respondents (64 percent). This finding also supports the 
initial inference that the ITC is biased in favor of complainants implied by the differences in win 
rates.  
I also find that the ITC is far more likely to impose injunctive relief as a remedy for 
infringement than are district courts. When it finds infringement, the ITC imposes injunctive 
relief (that is, an order barring importation and/or a cease-and-desist order) roughly 96 percent of 
the time. By contrast, after a finding of infringement, the district court grants injunctive relief 
only 20 percent of the time. This threat of nearly automatic injunctive relief at the ITC could 
result in inefficient outcomes for consumers, particularly by inducing “patent trolls” to bring 
cases to the ITC (as opposed to a district court) in hopes of extracting an inflated settlement from 
the respondent.  
In Part 5, I suggest possible reforms to the ITC role in patent enforcement that would be 
more consistent with the goal of social welfare maximization. Such reforms should minimize (1) 
the social costs associated with the ITC’s granting injunctive relief when such relief is not 
consistent with the public interest, and (2) the administrative costs associated with implementing 
and enforcing remedies. A good way to do this is to remove jurisdiction from the ITC over patent 
matters except for those that district courts cannot hear for lack of personal jurisdiction. If 
 8 
legislators do not cut back on the ITC’s jurisdiction, the ITC could reduce the social costs of ITC 
litigation by providing injunctive relief—that is, issuing an exclusion order—only in those 
circumstances where such relief would be available in district court under the Supreme Court’s 
eBay test.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
2.1 Empirical evidence on Section 337 investigations 
There are only a handful of economic studies that address ITC issues.
9 Three basic findings 
arise from the empirical literature: (1) patents litigated at the ITC may tend to be more valuable 
than patents generally, (2) complaining firms at the ITC are larger, have more product lines, have 
spent more on R&D and advertising, and are more profitable than their peer firms, and (3) a 
Section 337 ruling in favor of a complainant appears to have an overall negative effect on R&D 
spending, but a Section 337 ruling against a complainant is likely to have a more neutral effect. 
Co (2004) constructed a matched sample by randomly pairing for each patent in her ITC 
sample a patent from the NBER patent database
10 with the same technology class and application 
year. Co examines a database of 65 cases from 1995 to 2000 involving 109 patents. She finds 
that patents litigated under Section 337 belonging to the 1995-97 cohort are cited close to five 
times more than all other patents belonging to this cohort. In addition, she finds that patents 
litigated under Section 337 belonging to the 1995-97 cohort are cited more frequently (and hence 
are presumably more valuable) than all patents belonging to a “matched sample” from the NBER 
patent database. Because the NBER database contains patents that are not litigated, however, 
Co’s result might simply reflect the fact that litigated patents tend to be more valuable than non-
litigated ones. Co also compares her sample of patents litigated under Section 337 sample to the 
value calculated by a prior study for patents that were litigated in federal district court and found 
that patents litigated under Section 337 were more valuable. This comparison is complicated, 
however, by the fact that the two studies used samples of patents that came from different 
periods.  
                                                 
9 By contrast, there are many legal studies on the Section 337 process including Clark (1989); Glick (1980); Kopp 
(1991); LaRue (1974); Martin (1995); Plaine, Roll and Whitener (1987); Spangler (1991); Zeitler (1989). 
10 The NBER database contains information on all patents, including both patents that are litigated and patents that 
are not litigated. For a detailed description of the database, see Bronwyn (2001).  
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Mutti and Yeung (1996) compiled a database of all Section 337 cases from 1977 to 1990, a 
total of 262 cases. Financial data on publicly traded firms were found on 92 cases. They find that 
complaining firms at the ITC are (1) larger and have more product lines than peer firms in their 
industry, (2) have spent more on R&D and advertising than their peers, and (3) are slightly more 
profitable than their peers. They find that a favorable ruling for a complainant in an R&D-
intensive industry has no positive effect on R&D of the complainant, but an adverse ruling for a 
complainant in an R&D-intensive industry has a large negative effect on its R&D.  
The focus of Mutti and Yeung’s 1997 follow-up paper is on how different firms within the 
affected industry respond to a Section 337 action. They find that a Section 337 ruling in favor of 
a complainant appears to induce other firms within the industry that have the most R&D 
spending to cut back that R&D spending. They posit that this reflects the difficulty of continued 
innovation in the face of a potentially blocking patent. They find weaker evidence that a Section 
337 ruling against a complainant invigorates a patent race among other firms, concluding that the 
ITC process may promote collusion among domestic firms (Mutti and Yeung 1997).
11  
In conjunction, Mutti and Yeung’s two studies suggest that Type II errors (ruling for a 
complainant in a Section 337 proceeding when an unfavorable ruling is warranted) are more 
problematic than Type I errors (ruling against a complainant in a Section 337 proceeding when a 
favorable ruling is warranted). The 1996 study shows that an adverse ruling against a 
complainant has a negative effect on that firm’s investment. The 1997 study shows that an 
adverse ruling against a complainant has a positive effect on competitive firms. Thus, the net 
social costs of a Type I error would be small as these two effects would cancel out. By contrast, 
the 1996 study shows that there is no positive effect on a patent holder’s investment if it is 
granted an injunction, and the 1997 study shows there is a large negative effect on other firms’ 
investment if the patent holder is given an injunction. Thus, net social costs of a Type II error 
would be large because the small reduction in investment by the patent holder is swamped by the 
decline in investment by competing firms.  
                                                 
11“This reduced intensity of R&D efforts raises more general questions over the justification for Section 337 from 
the perspective of national and world welfare. Does Section 337 promote new innovation or does it provide an 
opportunity to keep foreign competition at bay and to promote domestic collusion?”. 
 10 
 
2.2 Are there any circumstances in which injunctive relief should not automatically follow a          
  finding of infringement? 
     I identify conditions under which permanent injunctive relief against patent infringers may 
not be consistent with the public interest. This section investigates the narrow question of 
whether injunctive relief is always appropriate as a remedy for infringement. 
  Strong patent enforcement, including the use of injunctive relief, can promote the public 
interest, but not always.
12 Lemley and Shapiro (forthcoming) use bargaining theory to show that 
the mere threat of obtaining a permanent injunction can greatly enhance a patent holder’s 
negotiating power and can lead to royalty rates that exceed the value of the patented technology 
and the strength of the patent. In particular, they demonstrate that the negotiated royalty rate for a 
single patent tends to be greatly elevated above a reasonable benchmark level if the value of the 
patented feature is small relative to the total value associated with the product. The benchmark 
level for reasonable royalties is meant to reflect the royalty rate that would be negotiated prior to 
any infringement if the patent were known to be valid.
13 The authors demonstrate that the hold-
up problems caused by the threat of injunctions are reduced if courts regularly stay injunctions to 
give defendants time to redesign their products to avoid infringement if possible.  
Lemley and Shapiro argue that permanent injunctions are appropriate if the patentee (1) and 
the alleged infringer both practice the patent and are thus in competition, (2) does not sell the 
patented product, but sells a different product in the same relevant market, (3) licenses the patent 
to a firm that competes in the market; or (4) is engaged in research and development in 
preparation to compete. In addition, they argue that injunctive relief is warranted if the defendant 
                                                 
12 The literature recognizes that, if patent holders lack confidence that their property rights will be firmly enforced, 
their incentives to innovate will be reduced. Without sufficient protection against infringing patents, U.S. firms 
would not invest at socially optimal levels in innovative activities. See, for example, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) 
finding empirical support for the positive effects of stronger patents in the U.S. semiconductor industry; Jaffe and 
Lerner (2001) finding that the intellectual property rights policy changes had a substantial, positive effect on lab 
patenting; Park and Ginarte (1997) finding that intellectual property protection is a significant determinant of 
physical and R&D capital accumulation, even after controlling for market freedom. 
13 The benchmark royalty rate is written as the product of the patent strength, the bargaining power of the patent 
holder, and the value per unit of the patented feature to the downstream firm in comparison with the next best 
alternative technology. 
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copies the idea from the patentee, even if the patentee is not participating in the market and has 
no plans to do so.  
Lemley and Shapiro also identify two conditions under which a permanent injunction is not 
appropriate: (1) when the product that would be enjoined contains multiple components, of 
which only one is the subject of the patent suit, and (2) when the patentee is not in the market 
and the defendant developed the technology independently rather than copying it from the 
plaintiff. 
In its recent eBay decision (see eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C. (126 S. Ct. 1837 [2006]), 
the Supreme Court ruled that patent holders seeking permanent injunctions against patent 
infringers are required to satisfy the traditional four-factor test to obtain an injunction. A plaintiff 
must show that (1) it suffered an irreparable injury, (2) remedies at law are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury, (3) an injunction is warranted in light of the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction. The Supreme Court gave little guidance as to what specific conditions 
would favor injunctive relief, but four Justices did give an example of where injunctive relief 
would not be consistent with the public interest, stating that  
 
when the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek 
to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement 
and an injunction may not serve the public interest. (eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, 
J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring)). 
 
According to FTC Chairman Deborah Majoras, the eBay decision conflicts with years of 
prevailing practice by lower courts, which have granted such injunctions almost automatically 
(see Majoras 2006). Majoras explains that, in deciding whether the plaintiff suffered an 
irreparable injury and whether remedies at law are adequate to compensate for that injury, it is 
important to determine whether the patentee uses its patent exclusively (by practicing the patent 
itself, producing a competing product, or licensing the patent exclusively) or non-exclusively (by 
licensing the patent to various entities). She points out that the grant of an injunction may allow 
the patent owner to appropriate more than the full value of its invention, as when a patentee “that 
sells no products [that is, is a non-practicing entity] and licenses non-exclusively asserts its 
patent after the accused infringer has sunk substantial costs into design, development, and 
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commercialization of the accused product.” (Majoras 2006, p. 6). Majoras also explains that hold 
up also is likely to occur in industries with patent thickets—that is, industries involving complex 
products covered by hundreds or even thousands of patents (Majoras 2006, pp. 7-8). 
 
3. Purported Benefits of Section 337 Investigations
 
In 1987, Congress amended the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 to “strengthen the 
effectiveness of Section 337 in addressing the growing problems being faced by U.S. companies 
from the importation of articles that infringe U.S. intellectual property rights.” (S. Rep. No. 100-
71, at 128 (1987)). As the committee report suggests, the core purpose of Section 337 is to 
provide U.S. companies with a remedy against foreign companies that fail to respect patent rights 
and other U.S. intellectual property. Despite its myriad (and often negative) connotations, I use 
the phrase “protectionism” to capture this original intended benefit of Section 337. I evaluate the 
merits of the protectionism rationale. Next, I evaluate the merits of two other purported benefits 
of the Section 337 process: greater speed in resolving patent disputes and filling gaps in federal 
district court jurisdiction. 
 
3.1 Protectionism 
The ITC’s historic mission was to protect U.S. industry from “unfair” competition and 
imports. The ITC obtained the authority to review patent infringement claims as a result of the 
protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Whatever one thinks of the merits of 
protectionism, ITC complaints are not confined to cases involving protection of domestic 
industries from unfair foreign imports. Less than two-thirds of the cases that the ITC hears today 
involve a domestic complainant and a foreign respondent, down from over 80 percent in the 
1980s. The only jurisdictional pre-requisites for an ITC complaint are that the defendant import 
articles (even if the defendant is a domestic company) and that the complaint satisfy the 
“domestic industry” requirement of Section 337(a)(2) – a requirement that a foreign firm can 
satisfy based on its own activities in the United States, as well as the activities of domestic 
subsidiaries and licensees. As a result, the ITC hears many cases by domestic firms against other 
domestic firms:  for example, Broadcom, a U.S. company that makes communications related 
technology, has pursued a complaint in the ITC against Qualcomm, another U.S. company that is 
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a world leader in wireless communications technology. The ITC also hears many complaints by 
foreign firms against other foreign firms. For example, in 2001, four cases were brought by 
foreign companies against other foreign companies: (1) Funai Electric v. Orion Electric, both of 
Japan, (2) Yamaha (Japan) v. Bombadier (Canada), (3) Rohm v. Nichia, both of Japan, and (4) 
Berry Finance N.V. (Belgium) v. Meister-Leisten Schulte GmbH (Germany). There were nine 
foreign-versus-foreign cases initiated in 2005. In still other cases, foreign firms may bring 
complaints against domestic companies. For example, Creative Laboratories, a Singaporean 
company, brought a complaint against Apple Computer, a U.S. company, seeking to bar 
importation of the iPod.  
To examine this systematically, I categorized each case in the ITC database according to the 
nationality of the complainant and respondent (see International Trade Commission website). I 
found a decrease in the number of Section 337 cases involving a domestic complainant and 
foreign respondent (“domestic-versus-foreign cases”).
14 Domestic-versus-foreign cases 
accounted for 82 percent (156 of 190) of all patent cases brought to the ITC in the 1980s that I 
could classify. In the 1990s, this share declined to 73 percent (74 of 102) of all patent cases 
brought to the ITC that I could classify. From 2000 through 2006, domestic-versus-foreign cases 
accounted for just 66 percent (97 of 148) of all patent cases brought to the ITC that I could 
classify. This trend away from the traditional paradigm of domestic-versus-foreign suggests that 
                                                 
14 Companies were classified as either foreign or domestic based on the location of their headquarters or country of 
incorporation. I relied primarily on the classification system used in the ITC’s own listing, which categorized most 
companies by state or country. Companies with headquarters in the United States were classified as domestic, except 
subsidiaries of foreign-based companies. A company was considered a subsidiary if at least 50 percent of its equity 
was owned by a foreign company, but publicly traded companies were not considered subsidiaries. If an individual 
was listed as the complainant or respondent, his or her primary country of residence was used for classification 
purposes. Cases with multiple companies were classified as foreign if a single foreign company was included. The 
ITC was designed to protect domestic manufacturers against foreign infringers, which implies that in the 
prototypical 337 case, the complainant is a domestic firm and the respondent is a foreign firm. The multiple 
company listing occurs more frequently for respondents (66 cases, 27 of which are coded as foreign) than 
complainants (356 cases, 331 of which are coded as foreign) in the ITC’s database. Thus, this rule is conservative 
because it supports the foreign-respondent prototype more frequently than it  changes the domestic–complainant 
prototype. If the ITC failed to provide country information for any party, the nationality of the company was 
classified using publicly-available information. The primary source for classifying a company was its own website. 
Many companies lacked a website due to bankruptcy or size, and in the absence of a company website, other sources 
were used, including financial listings, SEC filings, and online reference sources. Five cases could not be classified 
due to an inability to identify either the complainant or the respondent. These cases were excluded from our 
analysis. 
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the ITC is increasingly deviating from its original mission of protecting U.S. manufacturers from 
foreign infringers.
15
  Furthermore, it is not correct that the ITC has unique powers to bar importation of infringing 
products. Even in cases where the ITC has ruled, federal district courts retain full authority to 
enjoin a defendant’s importation of infringing articles (see Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Benun (463 
F.3d 1252, 1254-55 Fed. Cir. [2006])). In any case where a district court has jurisdiction over the 
manufacturer of infringing articles, the district court can address concerns about illegal imports.  
 
3.2 Greater speed in resolving patent disputes 
A second possible benefit to complainants could be the ITC’s speed, but greater speed is not 
necessarily a benefit to the public. To the extent the ITC is biased in favor of imposition of an 
injunctive remedy—and the data support that hypothesis—more rapid decisions mean the more 
rapid infliction of harm that such unwarranted injunctive remedies would entail. That is, speed is 
not necessarily desirable if it comes at the cost of sacrificing careful deliberation, accuracy, or 
other more important goals that adjudication serves. In any case, the data suggest that the ITC’s 
advantage in speed can be exaggerated.
16  
Moreover, those litigants for whom speed is crucially important have several options in 
federal court to obtain quick resolutions of their disputes. First, patentees can get preliminary 
injunctions in federal district court in as little as several weeks,
17 if they are able to meet the 
                                                 
15 The first patent case brought to the ITC was in 1972. By the end of 1975, only eleven patent cases had been 
initiated at the ITC. Given the small sample size for the 1970s (just 66 cases), the distribution of cases from the 
1970s are not included in this chart. The shares for that decade were 24 percent for domestic-versus-domestic cases, 
71 percent for domestic-versus-foreign cases, 5 percent for foreign-versus-foreign cases, and 0 percent for foreign-
versus-foreign cases. The sample size for other decades was 187, 100, and 148 for 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, 
respectively. 
16 Resolution of cases in district court takes on average between 10-23 months depending on what cases one 
includes in the measure (see Kesan and Ball (2006) pp. 39-40 showing that the median days to resolve a dispute in 
district court is less than 300 and that among cases resolved by a final ruling, the median days to resolution were 
between 564 and 685). ITC resolutions typically take between 12 and 18 months. See U.S. International Trade 
Commission: Answers to Frequent Asked Questions, at 27 (stating that “[h]istorically, the [ITC] has strived to 
complete most investigations in 12 to 15 months”); Toner (2005) stating that that the “turnaround time between 
filing and conclusion [in the ITC is] approximately 18 months”; Busey and Kolakowski (2006) stating that “[m]ost 
Section 337 proceedings are scheduled by the ITC for final determination within 12 to 14 months after institution.”  
17 Shapiro (1993) notes that “preliminary injunction motions have become effective tools in patent infringement 
actions and the courts have shown an increased willingness to grant such motions” and emphasizing the speed of 
these proceedings by stating, for example, that “applications [for preliminary injunctions] may be heard within days 
or weeks after filing of the patent action.” 
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usual requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction.
18 Second, some federal district courts have 
developed expedited procedures—“rocket dockets”—that may be available for patent cases.
19  
 
3.3 Filling gaps in federal district court jurisdiction  
There are two narrow situations where federal courts may not be able to hear cases involving 
infringing imports. First, a U.S. patent holder would be unable to use the federal courts to get a 
judgment against an infringing foreign manufacturer if that manufacturer lacks sufficient 
contacts with the United States to provide a basis for jurisdiction (Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S.I.T.C. 
(645 F.2d 976, 985 C.C.P.A. [1981]).
20 Second, a U.S. company may become aware that 
infringing goods are being imported into the United States but be unaware of the specific source, 
or there may be multiple unidentified sources for such goods (Koppikar 2004). In these cases, the 
U.S. company may not even know which company or companies it should be attempting to sue 
in federal district court.  
In either of these situations, a patent holder can seek relief only at the ITC under Section 337. 
Indeed, upon considering all three purported benefits of the ITC process, I conclude that the 
ITC’s role in filling gaps in federal court jurisdiction is the sole compelling benefit.   
 
4. Empirical Results on Possible Biases in Section 337 Investigations
This section tests for possible biases in the ITC’s decision-making process. I exploit the fact 
that a patent holder can assert its patent against an allegedly infringing import in two venues in 
the United States: the ITC or a district court. I estimate the win rate of complainants at the ITC 
                                                 
18 Shapiro (1993) notes that the standard in patent cases is similar albeit not identical to the one in non-patent cases 
and describing the four factors that must be met to obtain a preliminary injunction in a patent suit, namely “(1) a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships tipping in favor of 
the requesting party, and (4) that the issuance of an injunction is in the public interest”; (eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839) 
holding that the same four-factor test for granting permanent injunctions that applies in other types of litigation also 
applies in patent litigation. 
19 Creswell (2006) discusses the district court in Marshall, Texas, and its quick handling of patent cases; Vanden 
Plas (2006) quotes a patentee that successfully litigated its claim as saying:  “It is a rocket docket here. . . . I think 
that this case was not even a year old”; Baldas (2004) discusses how certain courts have developed rocket dockets 
for patent litigation that are popular with litigants. 
20 “An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties [and is] not contingent upon a determination of personal or 
“in personam” jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer.”). Although the nuances of jurisdiction are beyond the 
scope of this paper, an example of where such jurisdiction may be lacking is when a foreign infringer manufacturers 
a product abroad and sells it to another foreign firm that then incorporates it into a product that is then imported into 
the U.S. 
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compared to the win rate of plaintiffs in district court and also estimate the rate at which ITC 
decisions are upheld upon appeal at the Federal Circuit compared to the survival rate of appealed 
district court decisions. Although it is possible that patent holders’ initial win rate at the ITC 
differs from the win rate in district court as a result of selection bias—that is, if ITC complaints 
are systematically stronger than district court complaints—such selection bias should not affect 
rates of reversal on appeal. If anything, if this type of selection bias existed, it would lead to 
lower rates of reversal on appeal because stronger cases are likely to be less difficult or 
controversial to resolve and thus second-guessing by the appellate body is less likely. The data 
shows the exact opposite to be true, that the ITC is reversed more frequently, undermining any 
suggestion that selection bias is driving my results. To further assess the reliability of ITC 
decision making, I focus my analysis on 32 parallel cases that were tried at both the ITC and a 
district court.  
A second and potentially more serious type of bias at the ITC in favor of complainants is the 
ITC’s policy with respect to awarding injunctive relief once it finds that a patent was infringed. I 
thus compare the frequency of injunctive relief offered by the ITC and the district courts in cases 
where patent infringement was found. 
 
4.1 Does the ITC rule in favor of complainant too frequently? 
4.1.1 Percent of favorable outcomes for complainant at ITC  
The win rate for complainants in patent cases brought before the ITC is generally higher than 
the rate for patent holders in federal district courts. Between 1975 and 1988, the complainant 
prevailed in 75 percent of patent cases brought before the ITC, compared with a 40 to 45 percent 
win rate for plaintiffs in federal district courts (see Aoki and Prusa 1993 n.10). More recent data 
suggest that complainants continue to enjoy a high win rate at the ITC. For example, Schwartz 
(2002) calculates that between 1995 and 2000 complainants at the ITC enjoyed a 67 percent win 
rate.  
My review of the ITC’s Section 337 database identifies 467 completed proceedings that 





Table 1:  
Disposition of Completed ITC Cases as of Sept. 2006 
Type of case  Disposition (percent) 
Complaint withdrawn  51 (11%) 
Violation found  109 (23%) 
No violation found  85 (18%) 
Case settled  211 (42%) 
Other 11  (6%) 
Total 467 
Source: ITC Database from 1972 through 2006.  
 
Overall, the ITC found a violation in 109 cases out of 467 completed cases (23 percent).
21 
Treating settlements and the finding of a violation as favorable outcomes for the complainant, 
the complainant received a favorable outcome in roughly 65 percent of patent cases brought to 
the ITC.
22 Note that this calculation yields a number close to the 67 percent win rate estimate 
provided by Schwartz (2002).
23  
One way to examine whether the ITC is subject to political influence of the kind described in 
the introduction is to compare findings of infringement for various combinations of complainant 
and respondent type. Under a political economy theory in which political influence is channeled 
toward domestic manufacturers, a domestic complainant facing a foreign respondent (“domestic-
versus-foreign cases”) should secure a finding of infringement more frequently than a foreign 
complainant facing a domestic respondent (“foreign-versus-domestic cases”). In addition, a 
domestic complainant facing a foreign respondent should achieve a finding of infringement more 
frequently than a domestic complainant facing a domestic respondent (“domestic-versus-
domestic cases”), or a foreign complainant facing a foreign respondent. In the latter two 
situations, it is not unreasonable to assume that the political influence  exerted on behalf of 
                                                 
21 This number is conservative because it excludes cases in the database that show a remedy being granted but that 
do not specify that a violation was in fact found. But even with this conservative number, conditional on the ITC 
reaching a final ruling, the ITC finds in favor of the complainant 56 percent of the time 109/(109+85). 
22 I find that 18 cases both have a violation found and have a settlement. I thus exclude these duplicates from my 
calculation, meaning that the math here is (211 + 109 – 18)/467, which is 65%. This method for determining a 
favorable outcome at the ITC is conservative because it ignores cases where the database shows that a remedy was 
imposed (such as an exclusionary order), yet where the database does not state that a violation or settlement 
occurred, even though these outcomes are favorable. 
23 Schwartz (2002) also counts settlements (and presumably consent orders) as favorable for the complainant. 
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complainant and respondent would be comparable.
24 As Table 2 shows, the data appear to 
support this political economy hypothesis.  
Table 2: 
Likelihood that Complainant at the ITC Secures a Finding of Infringement, by Pairing of 
Litigants 
Pairing of Litigants  Completed cases  Finding of Infringement  Rate of Infringement 
Domestic-vs-domestic  56 13  23% 
Domestic-vs-foreign  348 88 25% 
Foreign-vs-foreign  55 8  15% 
Foreign-vs-domestic  3 0  0% 
Not categorized  5 0  0% 
Total  467 109  23% 
Source: ITC Database from 1972 through 2006.  
 
The fact that the ITC reached a finding of infringement in domestic-versus-foreign cases (25 
percent likelihood of infringement) much more frequently than it did in foreign-versus-foreign 
cases (15 percent likelihood of infringement) suggests that the ITC is subject to political 
influence by representatives of domestic firms.
25 There is also evidence of bias against foreigners 
in the district courts for the subset of patent cases tried by jury, which obviously will also affect 
all cases that settle (Moore 2003 pp. 1497, 1510).
26 However, the same research does not find 
evidence of bias by judges (Moore 2003),
27 which suggests that there is no political pressure in 
district courts. That is, the bias in the district courts seems to arise from jury xenophobia, 
whereas with the ITC, such bias could be political pressure or xenophobia or both on the part of 
the administrative judges. 
To determine whether the empirical rate of infringement or “win rate” at the ITC is high or 
low, one needs an appropriate benchmark. As a starting point, I compare the win rates of 
complainants at the ITC with the win rates of plaintiffs at district courts. Relative to the overall 
                                                 
24 In the case of a domestic complainant and a domestic respondent, one would expect Congress to take a keener 
interest on behalf of both parties.  
25 A one-sided test of proportions allows one to conclude that the rate of infringement for domestic-versus-foreign 
cases is greater than the rate of infringement for foreign-versus-foreign cases at the 5 percent level of significance. 
The same test allows one to conclude that the rate of infringement for domestic-versus-foreign cases is greater than 
the rate of infringement for domestic-versus-domestic cases at the 37 percent level of significance. 
26  Moore (2003) finds that domestic parties won 64 percent of the cases decided by a jury when their adversary was 
foreign, while foreign parties prevailed in the remaining 36 percent of such cases. 
27 Moore (2003) finds that in cases decided by judges, the patentee win rate is almost identical, with domestic 
patentees winning 35 percent of the time against foreign infringers, and foreign patentees winning 31 percent of the 
time against domestic infringers. 
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rate at which the ITC finds infringement (23 percent), only 6 percent of all patent cases in federal 
district court in 2000 resulted in a finding of infringement.
28 This simple difference in win rates 
supports the inference that the ITC is biased in favor of complainants relative to the district 
courts. Differences in procedure may account for a portion of the difference in win rates across 
the two patent venues, as district court patent cases often do not advance to a stage where a 
finding of infringement can occur. Conditional on reaching a trial at the district court, however, 
patent holders in district courts on average enjoy win rates in excess of 50 percent (49 percent in 
cases decided by a judge and 63 percent in cases decided by juries) (Moore 2000, pp. 365, 386). 
A very small percentage of patent cases at district courts go to trial, however,
29 and for the vast 
majority of cases that do not reach a trial, rulings of infringement are rare. Regardless of the 
source of the difference, procedural or otherwise, there is a significant difference in the rate at 
which patent holders achieve a finding of infringement at the ITC and in district courts. 
Benchmarking against win rates at district courts would be inappropriate under two 
scenarios: (1) district courts themselves could be biased and (2) district courts could hear 
different cases from the ITC. Under either scenario, the initial inference that the ITC is biased in 
favor of complainants would be undermined. The first scenario depends on the direction of the 
alleged bias at the district courts and the relative size of the biases at both venues. Given the 
empirical ordering of the win rates defined by the likelihood of infringement at the two patent 
venues, there are three hypotheses to consider. First, the ITC and the district court are biased in 
favor of complainants, but the bias at the ITC is stronger—that is, the unbiased win rate is less 
than or equal to the actual win rate observed at the district court. Second, the ITC is biased in 
favor of complainants and the district courts are biased in favor of defendants—that is, the 
unbiased win rate is between the actual win rate observed at the district court and the actual win 
                                                 
28 Kesan and Ball (2006, p. 35) find that (1) an explicit final ruling of infringement or (2) a judgment for the patent 
holder that could be interpreted as an infringement ruling was found in 6 percent of all cases from 1995, 6 percent of 
all cases from 1997, and 4 percent of all cases from 2000. The authors also find that many (3) consent agreements 
(nine in 1995, six in 1997, nine in 2000) as well as (4) definitive settlements (fifteen in 1995, fourteen in 1997, and 
fifteen in 2000) include an explicit ruling of infringement in the docket to formalize the agreement. See Kesan and 
Ball (2006, p. 35 n. 198). Combining (3) consent agreements and (4) definitive settlements with an explicit ruling of 
infringement with (1) explicit final rulings of infringement and (2) judgments for the patent holder that could be 
interpreted as a finding of infringement implies that 6 percent of all patent cases in 2000 resulted in a finding of 
infringement.  
29 Moore (2000, p. 384) shows that in 1998, 24 percent of all patent cases were resolved without court action, 59 
percent were resolved by court order or judgment on a motion, 13 percent were resolved after the pre-trial 
conference but before trial, and 5 percent of cases were resolved during or after the trial. 
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rate observed at the ITC. Third, the ITC and the district courts are biased in favor of 
defendants/respondents, but the bias at the district courts is stronger—that is, the unbiased win 
rate is greater than or equal to the actual win rate observed at the ITC. The initial inference that 
the ITC is biased in favor of complainants is false only if the third hypothesis is true. Based on 
my review of the literature, however, there is no theory or associated data that would support the 
claim that the ITC is biased in favor of defendants. For example, evidence of jury bias against 
foreigners in district courts would support the first hypothesis (that the ITC is biased in favor of 
complainants) but would not support the second or third hypothesis. Without any more data and 
setting aside the issue of selection, one cannot reject the initial inference based on a simple 
comparison of win rates that the ITC is biased in favor of complainants. 
Benchmarking against win rates at the district court would also be inappropriate if selection 
issues were significant. Stated differently, the difference in the win rates might be explained by 
differences between the type of cases that appear before the two patent venues. For example, if 
the district courts were to hear more domestic-versus-foreign patent cases, and if those cases 
were tried by juries rather than judges, it is theoretically possible that the win rate for plaintiffs at 
district courts would increase. The magnitude of the difference in win rates between the ITC and 
the district courts, however, do not appear to be explained by these two factors: Even if all cases 
in district courts were domestic-versus-foreign and if all of those cases were heard by juries 
rather than judges, the likelihood of a finding of infringement at district courts would not 
increase sufficiently to eliminate the gap in win rates between the ITC and district courts.
30 
Alternatively, the ITC may hear stronger patent cases than the district courts, which implies that 
if those stronger cases appeared instead before district courts, the win rates at district courts 
would increase. If the difference in win rates were solely the result of selection issues, then the 
empirical win rate at the district court would increase as ITC patent cases were moved to the 
district court. I explore this selection issue in detail in Parts IV.A.2 and IV.A.3. below. 
                                                 
30 The win rate at district courts across all patent cases initiated would increase by less than two percentage points 
(equal to the product of (1) the difference between a 64 percent win rate in cases decided by a jury when the plaintiff 
was domestic and their adversary was foreign and a 35 percent win rate in cases decided by a judge when the 
plaintiff was domestic and their adversary was foreign and (2) the roughly five percent probability of the case 
reaching a trial). See Moore (2003, pp. 1510, 1512). 
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4.1.2 Frequency with which ITC is overturned on appeal 
The higher initial rate of success of patent holders at the ITC could be attributed to “selection 
bias,” that is, if ITC cases tend to involve cases of particularly clear infringement, one would 
expect a higher rate of success.
31  As one way to eliminate the potential for selection bias, I have 
compared the rate at which ITC and district court decisions in patent cases are upheld on 
review.
32 Both ITC and district court decisions must be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit. Thus, a higher rate of reversal for ITC decisions as compared with district 
courts would tend to suggest that district court decisions are more accurate (that is, more likely to 
be correct) than ITC decisions. A higher rate of reversal for ITC decisions involving findings of 
patent infringement than for other ITC and district court decisions would tend to support a 
hypothesis of bias in favor of patent holders. It would also counter a suggestion of selection bias 
driving the results since if cases brought to the ITC were particularly clear cases of infringement, 
then one would expect to observe fewer reversals of ITC decisions than of district court 
decisions. Instead, the data support the hypothesis that district court decisions are more accurate, 
and that ITC decisions are biased in favor of patent holders.  
The frequency with which an ITC ruling is overturned on appeal has been reported by 
Greene (2000, 2001), who finds that between 1986 and 1999, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
Section 337 decisions 66 percent of the time. All twelve Section 337 cases reviewed by the 
Federal Circuit between 1998 and 1999 were upheld. Greene does not provide a breakdown for 
decisions in favor of complainant versus decisions against a complainant.  
There is some dispute over the precise “reversal rate” (that is, one minus the survival rate) for 
district court patent cases that are appealed to the Federal Circuit. A study by Federal Circuit 
Judge Kimberly Moore finds an average overall reversal rate for federal district court patent 
cases before the Federal Circuit between 1995 and 2000 of around 18 percent.
33 Although others 
                                                 
31 For example, this could be true if ITC cases typically involved outright piracy of patented goods by foreign 
producers. I have found no evidence to support that hypothesis, however.  
32 One might argue that selection effects determine which cases are appealed and that this undermines the validity of 
looking at appellate outcomes to judge whether bias exists. See, for example, Priest and Klein (1984) suggesting that 
selection effects determine which cases are appealed. Because similar selection effects influence the decision to 
appeal for different types of cases, however, selection effects should not drive differences in outcomes across those 
types.  
33  Moore (2001) averages rates for 1996 to 2000. Judge Moore also cites earlier research to give an overall 
affirmance rate of about 22 percent for the years 1983 to 1999. See Moore (2001, p. 3 n. 5, p. 17 tbl. 2). 
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have put the number slightly higher,
34 a 20 to 25 percent reversal rate for patent cases generally 
seems accurate. This also tracks the raw numbers for issue-specific reversals between 2000 and 
2004.
35 Comparing this survival rate (75 to 80 percent) with the survival rate estimated by 
Greene above (66 percent), one concludes that district court cases fare better than ITC cases on 
appeal.  
I attempted to update Greene’s statistics with the ITC database through September 2006. 
Although the “Related Court Decision(s)” field in the ITC’s database does not include some 
relevant district court decisions, it does appear to be sufficient to track the frequency with which 
the ITC is reversed on appeal. Table 3 summarizes these results. According to the ITC database 
as of July 2006, ITC determinations have been appealed in 63 investigations; 62 cases have been 
decided by the appellate courts, and one case is back before the ITC on remand.
36 The ITC has 
been affirmed 41 times (65 percent). Note that this estimate is roughly equal to Greene’s estimate 
of a 66 percent survival rate. Thirteen cases in which infringement was found were upheld. An 
ITC determination has been overturned in one form or another in 22 investigations.
37 In these 




                                                 
34 Chu (2001, pp. 1075, 1100) finds 37 percent reversal rate on the basis of a 28-month study of reversals and 
summary affirmances. Chu says his figures, excepting summary affirmances, track the 53 percent reversal rate 
identified by Judge Rader in dissent in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc. (138 F.3d 1448, 1476 Fed. Cir. 
[1998]). Judge Rader’s figures, however, gleaned from the Federal Circuit’s own statistics, actually sum both full 
and partial reversals on all issues. As Judge Rader points out, the statistics show the district court is only fully 
reversed in patent cases 27 percent of the time. See Cyber Corp (138 F.3d 1448, 1476 Fed. Cir. [1998]). 
35 The University of Houston Law School tracks the appellate treatment of patent suits by issue (University of 
Houston Law School). For literal infringement (category 23), the sum of all reversals and affirmances, gives a 
reversal rate of 22 percent. Broken down by party, the numbers show a 55 percent survival rate (on this issue alone) 
for the plaintiff, and a 90 percent survival rate for the alleged infringer. The numbers are similar for infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents (category 24). Summing all reversals and affirmances shows a 22 percent reversal 
rate. Note, however, that these statistics apparently include ITC determinations. That said, given the disparity 
between the number of cases decided by the commission and those before the district court (dozens versus 
hundreds), this is unlikely to skew the figures. 
36 The ITC database lists 67 records containing relevant Federal Circuit or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
cases. Only 63 contain a clear affirmance or rejection of an ITC determination. Some investigations have multiple 
appellate decisions. I treat the single case that was remanded to the ITC as being a reversal. 
37 These 22 cases include instances where the ITC’s determination has been affirmed in part, vacated in part, 
reversed in part, reversed or vacated. Some of these investigations have an additional appellate decision affirming 
the ITC’s determination on remand. 
38 In one case, 337-TA-406, the Disposable Cameras case, the Federal Circuit both helped and hurt the respondent (it 
limited the scope of the ITC determination somewhat, but upheld the exclusion order). 
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Table 3:  












= (C) / (A) 
In Favor of Complainant  25 12 13  52% 
In Favor of Respondent  38 10 28  74% 
Total   63 22 41  65% 
Source: ITC Database from January 1972 through July 2006.  
 
Table 3 shows that ITC cases in favor of respondents have a higher survival rate upon appeal 
(74 percent) than do ITC cases in favor of complainants (52 percent). Note that the survival rate 
of ITC cases in favor of respondents is nearly identical to the general survival rate of appealed 
district court cases (74 percent at the ITC versus 75 to 80 percent at a district court). By contrast, 
when the ITC rules in favor of a complainant, the survival rate is much lower than that of a 
district court. This suggests that ITC rulings in favor of a complainant are less reliable than 
rulings in favor of respondents, which is consistent with the hypothesis of bias at the ITC. 
One could argue that differences in institutional factors at the two patent venues, such as 
standards of review or the availability of the record, influence the likelihood of survival upon 
appeal to the Federal Circuit and therefore distort straightforward comparisons of survival rates. 
With respect to possible differences in standard of review applied to the ITC and a district court, 
claim construction is a matter of law, reviewed de novo whether from an ITC decision or a 
district court decision (see DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. (469 F.3d 1005, 
1013 Fed. Cir. [2006]) (the district court’s claim construction is reviewed de novo); Gemstart-
TV Guide Int'l, Inc. v. International Trade Commission (383 F.3d 1352, 1360 Fed. Cir. [2004]) 
(the ITC’s claim construction reviewed de novo)). With regard to factual issues (for example, 
infringement), the standard of review is not identical but it is very close (see Dystar Textilfarben 
GMBH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co. (464 F.3d 1356, 1360 Fed. Cir. [2006]) (“factual findings” in 
jury trial reviewed “for substantial evidence”); Sorenson v. International Trade Commission (427 
F.3d 1375, 1378 Fed. Cir. [2005]) (“This court reviews the factual determination of infringement 
by the International Trade Commission for substantial evidence.”). With regard to availability of 
the record, federal courts have transcripts and agencies record proceedings, both of which are 
available. All evidence is also available for the court of appeals’ inspection. For these reasons, 
such differences are unlikely to be important in explaining differences in survival rates.  
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4.1.3 Comparing outcomes in parallel district court/ITC proceedings 
Another way to control for possible selection bias is to analyze patents that have been the 
subject of litigation in both the ITC and a district court. The ITC’s online database identifies 
several examples of parallel or related district court cases (U.S. ITC Section 337 Database). 
Because the ITC database is incomplete, I conducted searches in both the Westlaw and Lexis 
combined federal district court case databases for patent cases brought both before the ITC and 
in district court.
39 My research identified 32 cases where proceedings involving the same (or 
closely related) patent issues were instituted in both the ITC and the federal district courts, 22 of 
which involved useful outcomes for purposes of my investigation.
40 The 32 parallel cases are 
listed in Appendix 1. 
The ITC and the district court both ruled in favor of the complainant in six cases; the ITC and 
the district court both ruled in favor of the respondent in five cases; the ITC ruled in favor of the 
complainant and the district court ruled in favor of the respondent in five cases; and the ITC 
ruled in favor of the respondent and the district court ruled in favor of the complainant in six 







                                                 
39 In Westlaw, my initial survey was conducted on Sept. 21, 2006, and identified memoranda, orders and opinions 
that included the words “International Trade Commission” and “337,” which produced 189 cases. I then surveyed 
the list to remove the cases dealing with dumping, countervailing duties, trademark or copyright violations. My 
Lexis search was also conducted on Sept. 21, 2006. There I searched for “International Trade Commission” and 
“337” and not “countervailing” or “dumping.”  That produced 93 cases, some of which were unique to Lexis. It is 
possible that there are a few additional cases not caught by this methodology. The only way to identify these cases 
would be to do individual keyword searches for each ITC investigation to see if a separate district court action was 
brought concerning the same patent, which does not mention the parallel ITC proceeding.  
40 I have attempted to categorize these cases into four major groups: (1) the ITC and district court both find for the 
complainant (c/c); (2) the ITC and district court both find for the respondent (r/r); (3) the ITC finds for the 
complainant and the district court favors the respondent (c/r); (4) the ITC finds for the respondent and the district 
court finds for the complainant (r/c). Cases that do not fit in any category, for example, because they were resolved 
on procedural grounds or because the district court decision did not address any issues common to the ITC 
determination, were not categorized. Of the 32 potential parallel cases, ten cases do not fit into any of the above four 
categories. My findings are detailed in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4:  
Distribution of Outcomes in Parallel Cases 
ITC Ruling 
Parallel Cases 












= (B) / (A) 
In Favor of Complainant  11  6  5  55% 
In Favor of Respondent  11  7  4  64% 
Total   22  13  9  59% 
Source: Westlaw and Lexis combined federal district court case databases for patent cases brought both before the 
ITC and in district court 
 
An ITC decision in favor of the complainant resulted in the same outcome in a parallel case in a 
district court 55 percent of the time, whereas an ITC decision in favor of the respondent resulted 
in the same outcome in a parallel case in a district court 64 percent of the time. Thus, ITC 
decisions in favor of respondents are more likely to yield similar outcomes in district courts than 
ITC decisions in favor of complainants. When the ITC rules in favor a plaintiff, the likelihood 
that the district court agrees with the ITC’s decision is not much better than chance. This 
suggests that the ITC may deviate from the district court’s standards when it rules in favor of a 
plaintiff.
41  
The difference in survival rate widens when one considers two parallel cases (Intel Corp. v. 
VIA Technologies, Inc. and Thomson Licensing S.A. v. Benq Corp.) that resulted in a settlement 
at the ITC but a decision in favor of the respondent at a district court. To the extent that these 
two cases can be considered reversals of ITC decisions in favor of complainants, the survival rate 
for such pro-complainant decisions falls from 55 percent to 46 percent (six cases out of thirteen 
cases), further increasing the disparity in survival rates between ITC decisions in favor of 
complainants (46 percent) and ITC decisions in favor of respondents (64 percent). 
Given the structure of the patent process, it is possible that the types of cases that are brought 
to both patent venues are not representative. When a case is pursued in both venues, the district 
court postpones its case to allow the ITC process to proceed, after which the parties return to 
court. A patent holder could learn in the ITC that its case is strong or weak and settle the district 
court accordingly. The resulting data set of parallel cases with a final decision in the district 
                                                 
41 18 of the 22 parallel cases involved a domestic complainant and foreign respondent. Of those, the ITC and the 
district court reached the same decision in 11 cases and reached the opposite decision in 7 cases.  
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court that remains could be a skewed set of cases that did not settle in response to the final ITC 
decision. It bears emphasis that of the 32 parallel cases considered here, however, only four 
involved settlements and only one, Intel versus VIA Technologies (Intel Corp. v. VIA Tech., Inc. 
(174 F. Supp. 2d 1038 N.D. Cal. [2001]), was settled at the ITC before or contemporaneously 
with the district court ruling. Notwithstanding these considerations, an analysis of parallel cases 
is a reasonable way of trying to correct for selection bias. The results support the initial inference 
that the ITC is biased in favor of complainants. 
 
4.2 Does the ITC offer injunctive relief too frequently? 
Patentees can use the threat of injunctive relief to extract high royalty rates in settlement 
from an accused infringer. If the odds of securing such an outcome are high (as they are at the 
ITC), that threat is credible. If the odds of securing injunctive relief are lower (as they are in a 
district court—even before eBay), that threat is less credible, and the resulting royalty rate will 
be lower.  
Under Section 337(d), the ITC is directed to issue an exclusion order when it finds that a 
respondent has violated Section 337 unless, “after considering the effect of such exclusion upon 
the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the U.S. economy, the production of like 
or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that 
such articles should not be excluded from entry.” (47 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1)).
42 As an empirical 
matter, a determination that an exclusion order is not in the public interest is rare:  the ITC has 
found an injunction to be inconsistent with the public interest in only three cases, compared with 
113 patent cases in which an exclusion order of some kind has been issued (Duvalle, McCabe 
and Bateman 2005, p. 347). ITC remedy determinations are reviewed by the President and can be 
vetoed for policy reasons, but such vetoes are also rare:  there have been only five since 1978, 
and none since 1987 (Duvalle, McCabe and Bateman 2005, pp. 365-69). 
The ITC’s very strong inclination towards issuing injunctive relief may be partly a reflection 
of the agency’s lack of flexibility in the remedies it has the authority to impose after a finding of 
patent infringement. If the ITC finds a violation of Section 337, the only remedy it can impose is 
                                                 
42 Under current ITC practice, an Administrative Law Judge recommends a remedy without taking public interest 
concerns into account. As a result, an exclusion order recommendation is automatic whenever a violation of the 
statute is found.  
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a limited or general exclusion order, accompanied in some cases by a cease-and-desist order.
43 
The district courts, by contrast, have more options at their disposal in fashioning infringement 
remedies. Although they undoubtedly make extensive use of injunctive relief to forestall future 
infringement, they also can impose money damages, which, depending on the violation, may be 
more economically appropriate. 
To determine whether the ITC is more inclined to offer injunctive relief because of its limited 
arsenal of remedies, I compare the incidence of injunctive relief at the ITC after a finding of 
infringement—which is extremely high—with the imposition of injunctive relief in a particular 
group of district court cases. Prior to eBay, many district courts failed to take sufficient account 
of public interest considerations militating against injunctive relief,
44 but despite this practice, I 
find that district courts that find infringement impose injunctive relief in only 20 percent of 
cases. In the future, however, one should expect that district courts will impose injunctive relief 
as a remedy for infringement less frequently because of the four-part test in eBay. This will make 
the ITC an even more attractive forum for patent disputes, leading to more inappropriate 
injunctions that result in a net harm to social welfare. 
 
4.2.1 Percent of exclusion/cease and desist orders issued at the ITC upon on a finding of patent 
infringement (“injunctive relief”) 
 
As of September 2006, the ITC’s database identified 467 completed patent-related Section 
337 actions. Of those, a violation was found in 109 cases (23 percent). Of the 109 completed 
patent cases in which a violation was found, the ITC issued an exclusion order or a cease-and-
desist order (that is, injunctive relief) in 103 cases (95 percent). In two cases, the ITC did not 
impose any remedy. In one case, Steel Rod Treating Apparatus and Components Thereof (1981), 
the parties settled after a violation was found. And another case, Hand-Held Mobile Computing 
Devices, Components Thereof And Cradles Thereof (2005), the complaint was withdrawn after a 
violation was found. I eliminate those two cases from the sample because the ITC did not have 
                                                 
43 Non-compliance can result in fines of not more than the greater of $100,000 a day or twice the value of the 
infringing imports for each day in violation (see 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2)). The ITC also has authority to enter a 
consent order, whereby the alleged violator agrees to comport with certain conditions in lieu of other relief, which 
the ITC retains authority to enforce. 
44 For example, Majoras (2006, p. 4) explains that “The Court agreed that the test should be used—a decision that 
conflicts with years of prevailing practice by lower courts which have granted such injunctions almost 
automatically.” 
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the opportunity to impose injunctive relief. Thus, upon finding a violation of Section 337 based 
on importation of articles that infringe a U.S. patent, the ITC offers injunctive relief 96 percent 
of the time (equal to 103 cases divided by 107 opportunities). 
 
4.2.2 Percent of injunctive relief relative to benchmark of federal district court cases 
Kesan and Ball (2006) empirically examine the adjudication and settlement of federal district 
court patent disputes during three years: 1995, 1997, and 2000 (Kesan and Ball 2006, sec. i). 
They find an explicit final ruling of infringement or a judgment for the patent holder that could 
be interpreted as an infringement ruling in 277 cases in those three years (Kesan and Ball 2006, 
p. 35). 155 of those 277 rulings occurred at trial (Kesan and Ball 2006, p. 36). Of those 155 
infringement rulings at trial, 32 resulted in a permanent injunction (Kesan and Ball 2006, p. 37 n. 
210). Thus, after a finding of infringement, the district court granted injunctive relief 21 percent 
of the time (equal to 32 divided 155). In summary, after a finding of infringement, the ITC offers 
injunctive relief about five times more often (96 percent versus 21 percent) than do the district 
courts. This difference would likely have a large impact on the negotiations between a patent 
holder and an accused infringer. When a patent case is before the ITC, the patent holder can 
more credibly threaten to pursue injunctive relief to extract a higher royalty rate. This greater 
bargaining leverage may induce “patent trolls” to file claims at the ITC in the first instance. 
 
4.2.3  Identifying ITC cases where injunctive relief was granted or a settlement was reached 
that would not likely have withstood application of the Supreme Court’s four-part test 
 
Borrowing from the literature, I identify two conditions under which injunctive relief may 
not be consistent with the public interest, including (1) when the product that would be enjoined 
contains multiple components, of which only one is the subject of the patent suit, or (2) the 
patentee is an NPE that asserts its patent after the accused infringer has sunk substantial costs 
into design, development, and commercialization of the accused product.
45 In ITC cases resulting 
                                                 
45 Lemley and Shapiro (2006) describe a third condition under which injunctive relief may not be consistent with the 
public interest: “An additional prerequisite for denying injunctive relief should be that the defendant developed the 
technology independently rather than copying it from the plaintiff. While the goal of patent remedies should be to 
align the plaintiff’s recovery with the actual value of its technical contribution, there is some risk that limiting 
damages and injunctive relief could encourage unscrupulous companies to steal another’s technology, reasoning that 
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in injunctive relief for which at least one of these two conditions were satisfied, the granting of 
injunctive relief might not have withstood application of the Supreme Court’s four-part test. I 
refer to cases in which the ITC granted injunctive relief when such relief was not consistent with 
the public interest as involving “Type II” errors. (I refer elsewhere to cases in which a tribunal 
erroneously fails to impose injunctive relief as involving “Type I” errors.)   
I limited my search for possible Type II errors by the ITC by examining patent cases initiated 
between 1990 and 2000 that resulted in an exclusion order or a settlement. The 22 cases that 
resulted in an exclusion order are listed in Appendix 2. For each case, I examined whether the 
conditions identified above (which I refer to as the “component” and “NPE” conditions) were 
satisfied. Of the 22 cases, 16 satisfied the component condition, and none satisfied the NPE 
condition.
46 The 54 cases that resulted in a settlement but not an exclusion order are listed in 
Appendix 3. Again, for each case, I examined whether the conditions identified above 
(component or NPE) were satisfied. Of the 54 cases, 37 satisfied the component case condition, 
four satisfied the NPE condition, and four satisfied both conditions. The fact that such a large 
percentage of recently settled cases at the ITC (nearly 70 percent) appears to satisfy conditions 
under which injunctive relief may not have been appropriate suggests that patent holders may be 
exploiting the ITC’s willingness to offer injunctive relief. That is, patent holders may be bringing 
cases to the ITC and not to a district court because the ITC offers them greater leverage to secure 
a settlement. The ITC’s propensity to offer automatic injunctive relief in these cases means that it 
may be committing a large number of Type II errors. 
One could argue that the ITC is already sensitive to component cases and thus no reform of 
the ITC process is needed. The ITC distinguishes exclusion orders that apply to the infringing 
article itself from exclusion orders that apply to products that contain the infringing article as a 
component—so-called “downstream” exclusion orders. When a complainant seeks to exclude 
downstream products, the ITC applies a balancing test originally formulated in the Erasable 
                                                                                                                                                             
if they are caught they will only have to pay ex post what they would have had to pay ex ante for a license (plus 
considerable litigation costs).”  One way to rationalize this condition is to consider it a prerequisite for either of the 
first two conditions. That is, the infringement must be non-willful to trigger either the component or the NPE 
condition. 
46 In some of those cases, the ITC’s order was immediately followed by an increase in prices. For example, after the 
ITC’s exclusion order in the Disposable Camera Case (337-TA-406), the price of disposable cameras increased from 
$7.93 in 2001 to $8.63 in 2002 (see General Merchandise (2001-2004). Although there is no reason to believe that 
this particular decision was incorrect and thus the increase in prices in this case may have been justified, it does 
illustrate the substantial consumer harm that could result if an unwarranted injunction were granted. 
 30 
Programmable Read-Only Memories (EPROMs) case,
47 and upheld by the Federal Circuit in 
Hyundai (Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Commission (899 F.2d 1204, 1209 Fed. 
Cir. [1990])). The EPROMs test requires consideration of several factors, including the value of 
the component versus the value of the downstream product, the difficulty of enforcement, the 
marginal value of downstream exclusion to the complainant, the marginal detriment to the 
respondent, the burden on third parties, and the possibility of evasion absent the exclusion 
order.
48 Ostensibly, the EPROMs test is designed to allow the ITC to circumscribe an exclusion 
order in the interests of “sensitivity and objectivity,” as the Hyundai court put it (Hyundai, 899 
F.2d at 1209). However, the EPROMs test does not deal with an important aspect of the problem. 
The EPROMs test applies only when an infringing article is incorporated into a downstream 
product. It does not apply in situations where a single article encompasses many inventions, with 
the patented invention contributing insignificant incremental value. For example, an integrated 
circuit may implicate hundreds of patents, but if it is found to infringe a single patent, the 
integrated circuit is treated as an infringing article and is subject to almost automatic exclusion 
without application of the EPROMs test. The EPROMs cases are presented in Appendix 4.  
Injunctive relief offered by the ITC in component or NPE cases can have detrimental effects 
on consumer welfare in two primary ways. First, if the exclusion order is actually issued, 
consumers are forced to stop using the excluded products, forced to use a less desirable substitute 
product, forced to bear the potentially high costs of switching to using a substitute product, and 
potentially forced to pay higher prices for and consume less of the substitute product if the 
exclusionary order reduces competition. Second, even if it is not issued, the mere threat of an 
exclusionary order can lead to higher prices, lower output, or both. One reason for these 
detrimental effects is that patent holders have excessive leverage over respondents given the 
ITC’s nearly automatic injunction remedy. If the exclusion order is issued, then respondents will 
have to (1) cease production of their product, (2) pay fees to use the patented product, or (3) bear 
the switching costs of using a substitute product for the patented product and the costs of using a 
less desirable product. Injunctions can often have positive social effects if used judiciously, but 
                                                 
47 In re Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof, Products Containing Such 
Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories, Inv. No. 337-TA-276, USITC Pub. 2196 (May 1989) 
[hereinafter EPROMs]. 
48 See EPROMS, Comm’n Op. at 124-26, 136. 
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the essentially automatic nature of injunctive relief in ITC proceedings even when such 
injunctions are not warranted causes social harm.  
 
5. Possible Reforms of the ITC 337 Process  
 
When the ITC’s primary benefit—its ability to protect intellectual property in cases where 
the district courts lack jurisdiction—is weighed against the primary pitfall—the risk of 
unnecessary injunctive relief—the need for reform becomes clear.  
This section suggests reforms that would minimize the sum of (1) the social costs of errors 
committed by the ITC and (2) any administrative costs associated with implementing the 
reforms. Because the ITC offers injunctive relief virtually automatically upon finding 
infringement, my proposed reforms of the ITC process would not necessarily increase Type I 
errors (that is, failing to offer injunctive relief when such relief is necessary),
49 and even if they 
did, the benefits from committing fewer Type II errors are likely to offset the costs of 
committing more Type I errors.
50 Thus, the objective of minimizing the social costs of errors 
committed by the ITC may simplify to minimizing Type II errors committed by the ITC.  
To address the cost-minimization objective, I offer two basic reforms. The first reform 
(Reform 1) would give the district courts sole responsibility for adjudicating patent disputes 
whenever they have jurisdiction over the parties and would remove jurisdiction from the ITC to 
hear any Section 337 cases other than those that federal district courts cannot hear. The second 
reform (Reform 2) would leave ITC jurisdiction unchanged, but would require the ITC to apply 
the same test for imposition of an exclusion order as a district court applies for imposition of 
other types of injunctive relief. The second reform could be achieved without legislation through 
internal reform of the ITC’s decision making criteria.  
                                                 
49 To understand why any reform that decreased the likelihood of injunctive relief from 100 percent to something 
less would not necessarily increase Type I errors, consider the following stylized example. The ITC receives 30 new 
cases per year. Of those, ten cases implicate one of the two conditions (or both) under which injunctive relief may 
not be consistent with the public interest. If the reform prevents the ITC from offering automatic injunctive relief 
(conditional on a finding of infringement) in those ten cases, then the probability of a Type I error for those cases 
does not increase, as those cases may not warrant injunctive relief in the first place. If the ITC continues to offer 
automatic injunctive relief (conditional on a finding of infringement) for the remaining 20 cases where injunctive 
relief may be consistent with the public interest, then the probability of a Type I error does not increase, as the ITC 
will never fail to offer such relief when it is warranted.  
50 Mutti and Yeung (1997) demonstrate that a failure to grant injunctive relief to a complainant, including in cases 
when such relief is presumably needed, does not significantly affect investment decisions. 
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5.1 The two cost components of the policymaker’s objective function 
In this section, I describe the two cost components in a policymaker’s objective function: (1) 
social costs associated with Type II errors and (2) social costs associated with administering the 
reform.
51 Although uniformity costs also go into a policymaker’s objective function, I here 
conservatively assume that ITC adjudication is as uniform as district court adjudication. 
5.1.1 Social costs relating to Type II errors 
The statistics presented in Part IV demonstrate that the ITC is more likely to offer injunctive 
relief when it is not consistent with the public interest than are district courts—that is, the ITC is 
more likely to commit Type II errors. The ITC not only finds infringement more frequently than 
district courts, but when it does find infringement, the ITC awards injunctive relief far more 
often than district courts. While some of the injunctions imposed by the ITC were presumably 
consistent with the public interest, the probability of the ITC’s offering injunctive relief when 
such relief is not consistent with the public interest is higher than in a district court. These Type 
II errors can result in large social costs, typically in the form of higher end-user prices and 
reduced output. Indeed, these adverse effects can result from just the threat of an injunction, 
since complainants can secure settlements that include inflated royalties that are then passed on 
to end users.  
 
5.1.2 Social costs relating to administering the reform 
The second cost component of the policymaker’s objective function relates to the cost of 
implementing the proposed reform. One important consideration is whether district court 
litigation is more or less expensive than ITC litigation, but this paper does not attempt to assess 
whether litigation of patent disputes in the ITC, in the first instance, is more or less expensive 
than litigation in district courts. However, there are other administrative costs that are worth 
noting.  First, broad ITC jurisdiction can lead to frequent duplicative litigation, which increases 
                                                 
51 This approach is common in the law and economics literature (see Posner (2003) stating that the objective of a 
procedural system is to minimize the sum of the cost of erroneous judicial decisions and the cost of operating that 
system; Shavell (2004) identifying procedural mechanisms to reduce the sum of error costs and decision costs; 
Posner (1973) postulating that framework of adjudication is to minimize the sum of error costs and direct costs, both 
public and private). 
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administrative costs. And second, damages are a cheaper remedy because, unlike injunctions, 
they do not involve monitoring, which increases administrative costs.  
 
5.2 Proposed reforms 
5.2.1 Give the district court exclusive jurisdiction over any patent law claims in which it has    
jurisdiction over the parties 
One solution to the objective of minimizing the sum of social costs from Type II errors and 
the lack of uniformity in patent law is to give district courts exclusive jurisdiction over any 
patent law claims in which it has jurisdiction over the parties. Under this approach, the only 
cases in which the ITC would be permitted to adjudicate patent rights are those in which the 
district courts cannot do so, either because the accused infringer is not subject to the district 
court’s jurisdiction or because the infringer cannot be identified. 
If the district courts were given the ITC’s current caseload, plaintiffs in those cases would 
likely achieve fewer findings of infringement, and conditional on achieving such a finding, 
plaintiffs would achieve injunctive relief less frequently, as shown in Part IV. Thus, the 
frequency of Type II errors across all patent cases would decline. To the extent that this approach 
resulted in the district courts committing more Type I errors (relative to the ITC), the benefits 
from committing fewer Type II errors are likely to offset the costs of committing more Type I 
errors. According to Mutti and Yeung, a failure to grant injunctive relief to a complainant 
(including cases when such relief is presumably needed) does not significantly affect investment 
decisions. Thus, the cost of failing to offer injunctive relief when it is needed (in terms of 
reduced future welfare due to reduced current investment) is likely smaller than the cost of 
offering injunctive relief when it is not needed (in terms of less current welfare due to higher 
prices). 
It seems likely that this proposed reform will also tend to reduce administrative costs. 
Eliminating the overlapping jurisdiction of the ITC will eliminate the possibility of serial 
litigation of the same patent disputes, first at the ITC and then in district courts, with substantial 
savings both in terms of resources of the ITC itself and of the parties to the litigation. And since 
the district courts can impose damages rather than injunctions, that will lower monitoring costs.   
 
 34 
5.2.2 Require the ITC to apply ordinary standards for imposition of injunctive remedies 
Another possible reform would be to allow the ITC to retain its current jurisdiction but 
require the ITC to apply the same test for application of injunctive remedies as the district courts, 
that is, the public interest test defined by the Supreme Court in eBay. In particular, a complainant 
at the ITC seeking an exclusion or cease-and-desist order should be required to show that (1) it 
suffered an irreparable injury, (2) remedies at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury, 
(3) an importation ban is warranted in light of the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
the defendant, and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by an importation ban. In 
applying that test, the ITC should explicitly consider the availability of remedies in district court. 
In other words, as long as the respondent is subject to jurisdiction of a U.S. court, the availability 
of damages remedies (and other relief) should be taken into account in deciding whether to 
impose an exclusion order. This second reform has the advantage that it could be implemented 
without legislative action. The language of the statute already authorizes the ITC to take such 
equitable considerations into account. Thus, Section 337(c) provides that the Commission must 
consider “[a]ll legal and equitable defenses . . . in all cases,” and the public interest language of 
section 337(d)(1)—though it has been given a narrow reading by the ITC in the past—would 
appear to require consideration of public interest factors before imposing any exclusion order. As 
an alternative, Congress could adopt legislative guidance to clarify the public interest standard in 
a manner consistent with economic theory. For example, Congress could provide guidance on 
how the availability of commercial substitutes informs a public interest determination. A 
reasonable rule would dictate that the ITC should generally withhold any importation ban for 
products that lack commercially available substitutes, under the rationale that the social costs of 
banning imports without substitutes outweighs the other elements of the public interest test.  
Another potential advantage of this reform is that it would not include the use of juries, 
which as noted earlier, may be biased. At the same time, this advantage would need to be 
weighed carefully against possible biases in ITC decision making relative to those of district 
courts. This proposed reform would have minimal administrative costs. In the transition phase, 
the ITC would have to study how federal district courts implement the test articulated in eBay. 
However, by limiting the cases in which injunctions are granted, this reform would limit the 
social costs from monitoring. 
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6. Conclusion
This paper is the first to rigorously measure biases in the ITC’s decision-making process. 
One indication of bias is comparing the ITC’s propensity to find infringement with that of a 
district court. Although this comparison may be affected by selection issues, two tests that 
attempt to control for selection lend support for the claim that the ITC is biased in favor of 
complainants. A more formal treatment of the selection issue, perhaps involving an analysis of a 
plaintiff’s decision on where to bring a patent case, would provide further insight on the ITC’s 
bias in favor of complainants. The choice of patent venue could be modeled as a function of 
several explanatory variables, including patent strength (citations made and originality), industry 
type, and the size of the patentee. With a better understanding of the factors that influence the 
venue choice, one could estimate the marginal win rates and frequency of injunction if the ITC’s 
caseload were moved to the district courts as contemplated under my first remedy.  
A second indicator of bias relates to the type of remedies that the ITC and the district courts 
impose when they find infringement. I find that the ITC imposes injunctions—the most favorable 
remedy for patent holders—at five times the rate of district courts. Indeed, the difference is so 
stark (96 percent at the ITC versus 20 percent at a district court) that it could induce patent trolls 
to take advantage of the Section 337 process. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, 
one would expect this differential to widen, as injunctive relief should be awarded less frequently 
in district courts. The resulting adverse selection problem implies that even more socially 
inefficient “hold up” should occur in the future in ITC litigation. 
Reform of the ITC process should be aimed at minimizing the sum of the social cost of errors 
and administrative costs. Giving the district courts the sole responsibility for adjudicating patent 
disputes whenever they have jurisdiction over the parties would reduce error costs while likely 
not imposing additional administrative costs. This solution would leave the ITC as a backstop to 
adjudicate patent disputes that could not be brought in federal district court. An alternative 
reform would be for the ITC to retain its current jurisdiction but reform its decision making to 
bring its practice with regard to issuance of injunctive remedies into line with the practice of 
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Claimant(s)  Respondent(s)  ITC Disposition  District Court 
Disposition 
Category 
337-TA-004  W.L. Gore & 
Associates v. 
Oak Materials 
Group, 424 F. 
Supp. 700, 192 
USPQ 687 ( D. 
Del. 1976). 
W.L. Gore & 
Associates, Inc. 
Johnson & 
Johnson, Inc., et 
al. 
No Violation  Claimant 
disaffirmed all 
claims to the 
patent. Court had 
no jurisdiction to 
decide case.  
Rest of case was 
determination of 
who has to pay 
court costs. Only 
judgment was 
that respondent 
did not establish 
enough evidence 





USITC, 414 F. 







A.G., et al. 
Settlement District  court 
dismissed action 
by distributors, 
not parties to 
ITC proceeding, 





337-TA-037  See Stevenson v. 
Grentec, Inc., 






Los Angeles, CA 
New Zeal 






court and 9th 
Cir. initially find 
for respondent. 
CCPA reverses. 






337-TA-097  Ashlow Ltd. v. 
Morgan 
Construction 
Co., 672 F.2d 
371, 213 USPQ 
671 (4th Cir. 
1982); Ashlow 
Ltd. v. Morgan 
Const. Co., 1982 
WL 52161, 










overturns ITC in 
favor of 
respondent (but 










Australia, et al. 
Other (ITC 
found the 
















and defense of 
license barred by 






337-TA-171  Glasstech, Inc. v. 
AB Kyro Oy, 
Order (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 17, 
1984). 
Glasstech, Inc.  AB Kyro Oy, 




District court did 
not address the 
merits of the 
infringement 
claim, though it 
did take the 
ITC's findings 
into account in 
the "success on 





and ITC are in 
accord. 
c/c 




Inc., 671 F. 
Supp. 1369, 5 
USPQ2d 1545 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), 
aff'd, 868 F.2d 
1251, 9 USPQ2d 
1962 (Fed. Cir. 
1989); 674 F. 
Supp. 1074, 7 
USPQ2d 1806 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); 
683 F. Supp. 81, 
7 USPQ2d 1809 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); 
683 F. Supp. 
979, 7 USPQ2d 
1810 (S.D.N.Y. 







No Violation  ITC ruled patents 
infringed, but 







as moot. District 
court found 
patents valid and 
infringed. 
r/c 
337-TA-212  616 F. Supp. 
1134, 228 USPQ 
726 (D. Del. 
1985); 721 F. 
Supp. 596, 12 
USPQ 1275 (D. 
Del 1989), 
appeal denied, 
904 F.2d 44 
(Fed. Cir.) 
[unpublished], 
reh'g denied, 903 
F.2d 822 (Fed. 
Cir.), reh'g en 
banc denied, 
(Fed. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 
897 (1990); 814 
F. Supp. 1197, 
26 USPQ2d 
1667 (D. Del. 
1993); 817 F. 




Co., Ltd., et al. 
No violation.  Does not appear 
to be a direct 
ruling on patent 
validity. District 
courts find no 
preclusive effect 













337-TA-215  Tandon Corp. v. 
Mitsubishi 
Electric Corp., 
et. al., Order 
(C.D. Cal. April 
30, 1986). 
Tandon Corp.  Mitsubishi Elec. 







337-TA-228 Comair  Rotron 
v. Matsushita 
Elec. Corp., 31 























v. Hyundai Elec., 
Ltd., 49 F. Supp. 



















v. Minigrip, Inc., 
648 F. Supp. 
1488 (N.D. Ill. 
1986). 












the ITC had 




were carried over 











relating to the 




invited to pose 






337-TA-281 The  procedural 








Amgen, Inc.  Chugai 
Pharmaceuticals 
Co., Ltd. 
No violation.  In brief, the ITC 




article and not 
the process used 
to produce the 
imports. That 
ruling was 
vacated by the 
Federal Circuit, 
which found the 
ITC should have 
decided the case 
on the merits. 
Various district 
courts, however, 
held the ‘008 





v. Frank Su 
Enterprises 





v. Frank Su 





































337-TA-324 Levi  Strauss  & 
Co. v. Golden 






& Golden Trade 
S.R.L. 















337-TA-358 Genentech,  Inc. 
v. Novo Nordisk, 
935 F. Supp. 260 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
Genentech, Inc.  Novo-Nordisk 
A/S, et al. 










Manuf. Co. v. 
Beautone 
Specialties Co., 
117 F. Supp. 2d 
72 (D. Mass. 
1999). 
3M Taiwan  Hopax 
Chemicals 
Manufacturing 
Co., et al. 













337-TA-406  Fuji Photo Film 
Co., Ltd. v. Jazz 
Photo Corp., 249 
F.Supp.2d 434 
(D.N.J. 2003); 






cease & desist 
order; general 
exclusion order. 















repaired and not 
impermissibly 
restored. 
337-TA-428  Intel Corp. v. 
VIA Tech., Inc., 
174 F. Supp. 2d 



















v. Tessera, Inc., 
192 F.R.D. 637 
(C.D. Cal. 2000). 
Tessera, Inc.  Texas 
Instruments, Inc., 
et al. 







action at ITC, 
finding little 
chance that TI 
would succeed in 









337-TA-434 Medrad,  Inc.  v. 
Tyco Healthcare, 
391 F. Supp. 2d 
374 (W.D. Pa. 
2005). 
Medrad, Inc.  Nemoto 
Kyorindo Co. 
Ltd., et al. 
No violation.  District court 
held patentee 
could not use 









337-TA-439  PCTEL, Inc. v. 
Agere Systems, 
Inc., 2006 WL 
734385 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 20, 
2006). 
PCTEL, Inc.  Smart Link Ltd., 
et al. 
Settlement. District  court 
partially differs 








Fujitsu Ltd., 286 
F. Supp. 2d 1161 


















337-TA-474 U.S.  Philips 
Corp. v. Princo 
Corp., 361 F. 
Supp. 2d 168 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
Philips Corp.  Acme 
Production 
Industries, et al. 










414 F. Supp. 2d 

















patent issues into 
separate actions. 
337-TA-497 Chamberlain 
Group v. Skylink 
Technologies, 
Inc., 292 F. 
Supp. 2d 1040 





Inc., et al. 





Patent claims go 
to ITC. 
r/r 
337-TA-506  Zoran Corp. v. 
Mediatek, 2005 
WL 3448070 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 
15, 2005). 





Inc., et al. 
Violation; cease 














v. Osram GmbH, 
377 F. Supp. 2d 
149 (D.D.C. 
2005). 
OSRAM GmbH.  Dominant 
Semiconductors 
















Cal. Nov. 15, 
2004). 
Verve LLC  Thales e-
Transactions, 
Inc., et al. 
Complaint 
withdrawn. 














BenQ Corp., et 
al. 




337-TA-535  Ciena v. Nortel, 
2005 WL 
1189881 (E.D. 
Tex. May 19, 
2005). 
Ciena Corp.  Nortel Networks 






motion to force 
complainant to 
withdraw from 
ITC proceedings.  
w/r 
Notes: c/c means the ITC and district court both find for the complainant; r/r means the ITC and district court both 
find for the respondent; c/r means the ITC finds for the complainant and the district court favors the respondent; r/c 
means the ITC finds for the respondent and the district court finds for the complainant; w means the case was 
withdrawn and s means the case settled. 
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APPENDIX 2: CANDIDATES FOR TYPE II ERRORS BY THE ITC—CASES THAT RESULTED IN AN EXCLUSION 
ORDER (WITHOUT SETTLEMENTS) BETWEEN 1990 AND 2000 
Investigation Number  In the Matter of Certain  Condition 1: Component?  Condition 2: 
Non-Practicing Entity? 
337-TA-314 Battery-Powered  Ride-On  Toy 
Vehicles and Components 
Thereof  
Yes. No. 
337-TA-320  Rotary Printing Apparatus Using 
Heated Ink Composition, 
Components Thereof, and 
Systems Containing Said 
Apparatus and Components 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-333 Woodworking  Accessories  No.  No. 
337-TA-334  Condensers, Parts Thereof and 
Products Containing Same, 
Including Air Conditioners for 
Automobiles 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-344  Cutting Tools For Flexible 
Plastic Conduit and Components 
Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-354 Tape  Dispensers  No.  No. 
337-TA-364 Curable  Fluoroelastomer 
Compositions and Precursors 
Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-365  Audible Alarm Devices for 
Divers 
No. No. 
337-TA-366  Microsphere Adhesives, Process 
For Making Same, and Products 
Containing Same, Including Self-
Stick Repositionable Notes 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-372 Neodymium-Iron-Boron 
Magnets, Magnet Alloys, and 
Articles Containing the Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-376  Variable Speed Wind Turbines 
and Components Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-382  Flash Memory Circuits and 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-383 Hardware  Logic  Emulation 
Systems and Components 
Thereof 
No. No. 
337-TA-391  Toothbrushes and the Packaging 
Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-395  EPROM, EEPROM, Flash 
Memory, and Flash 
Microcontroller Semiconductor 




337-TA-406  Lens-Fitted Film Packages  Yes.  No. 
337-TA-413 Rare-Earth  Magnets  and 
Magnetic Materials and Articles 
Containing the Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-416  Compact Multipurpose Tools  No.  No. 
337-TA-422  Two-Handle Centerset Faucets 
and Escutcheons, and 
Components Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-430  Integrated Repeaters and 
Products Containing the Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-435  Integrated Repeaters, Switches, 
Transceivers, and Products 
Containing Same 
Yes No 




APPENDIX 3: CANDIDATES FOR TYPE II ERRORS BY THE ITC—CASES THAT RESULTED IN A SETTLEMENT 
(WITHOUT EXCLUSION ORDER) BETWEEN 1990 AND 2000 
Investigation Number  In the Matter of Certain  Component  NPE 
337-TA-309  Athletic Shoes With Viewing 
Windows 
No. No. 
337-TA-310  Pyrethroids and Pyrethroid-Based 
Insecticides 
No. No. 
337-TA-312 Dynamic  Random  Access 
Memories, Static Random Access 
Memories, Components, and 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-316  Power Transmission Chains, 
Chain Assemblies, Components 
Thereof, and Products Containing 
Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-318 Anti-Knock  Ignition Systems and 
Automobiles or Automobile 
Component Parts Containing 
Same 
Yes Likely  yes. 
337-TA-322  Microporous Nylon Membrane 
and Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-323  Monoclonal Antibodies Used For 
Therapeutically Treating Humans 
Having Gram Negative Bacterial 
Infections 
No. No. 
337-TA-325  Static Random Access Memories 
and Integrated Circuit Devices 
Containing Same, Processes For 
Making, Components, and 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-326  Scanning Multiple Beam 
Equalization Systems For Chest 
Radiography and Components 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-329  Vacuum Cleaners  No.  Possibly licensed. 
337-TA-331 Microcomputer  Memory 
Controllers, Components Thereof 
and Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-332  Translucent Ceramic Orthodontic 
Brackets 
No. No. 
337-TA-336  Single In-Line Memory Modules 
and Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
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337-TA-338  Bulk Bags and Process For 
Making Same 
No. No. 
337-TA-339 Commercial  Food  Portioners, 
Components Thereof, Including 
Software, and Process Thereof 
Yes. Maybe.   
337-TA-341  Static Random Access Memories, 
Components Thereof and 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-342  Circuit Board Testers  No.  No. 
337-TA-345  Anisotropically Etched One 
Megabit and Greater DRAMs, 
Components Thereof, and 
Products Containing Such 
DRAMs 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-348  In-Line Roller Skates With 
Ventilated Boots And In-Line 
Roller Skates With Axle Aperture 
Plugs and Components Parts 
Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-350  Sputtered Carbon Coated 
Computer Disks and Products 
Containing Same, including Disk 
Drives 
Yes. Yes.   
337-TA-356 Integrated  Circuit  Devices, 
Processes For Making Same, 
Components Thereof, and 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-357  Sports Sandals and Components 
Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-359  Dielectric Miniature Microwave 
Filters and Multiplexers 
Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-362  Methods of Assembling Plastic 
Ball Valves and Components 
Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-367 Facsimile  Machines  No.  No. 
337-TA-368  Rechargeable Nickel Metal 
Hydride Anode Materials and 
Batteries, and Products 
Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-373  Low-Power Computer Hard Disk 
Drive Systems and Products 
Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-381  Electronic Products, Including 
Semiconductor Products, 
Manufactured by Certain 
Processes 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-385 Random  Access  Memories, 
Processes for the Manufacture of 




337-TA-386  Global Positioning System 
Coarse Acquisition Code 
Receivers and Products 
Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-387  Self-Powered Fiber Optic 
Modems 
No. No. 
337-TA-388 Dynamic  Random  Access 
Memory Controllers and Certain 
Multi-Layer Integrated Circuits, 
as Well as Chipsets and Products 
Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-389  Diagnostic Kits for the Detection 
and Quantification of Viruses 
No. No. 
337-TA-394  Screen Printing Machines, Vision 
Alignment Devices Used Therein, 
And Component Parts Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-400  Telephonic Digital Added Main 
Line Systems, Components 
Thereof, And Products 
Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-401  CD-ROM Controllers and 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-402  Integrated Circuits and Products 
Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-404  SDRAMs, DRAMs, ASICs, 
RAM-and Logic Chips, 
Microprocessors, 
Microcontrollers, Processes for 
Manufacturing Same and 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-405  Automotive Scissors Jacks  No.  No. 
337-TA-407  Remodulating Channel Selectors 
and Systems Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-408 Recombinantly  Produced 
Hepatitis B Vaccines and 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-414  Semiconductor Memory Devices 
and Products Containing Same 
No. No. 
337-TA-417  Code Hopping Remote Control 
Systems, Including Components 
and Integrated Circuits Used 
Therein 
No. No. 
337-TA-421 Enhanced  DRAM  Devices 
Containing Embedded Cache 
Memory Registers, Components 
Thereof, and Products Containing 
Same 
No. No. 




337-TA-427  Downhole Well Data Recorders 
and Components Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-429  Bar Clamps, Bar Clamp Pads, and 
Related Packaging, Display, and 
Other Materials 
No. No. 
337-TA-431  Synchronous Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Devices, 
Microprocessors, and Products 
Containing Same 
Yes. Yes. 
337-TA-432  Semiconductor Chips With 
Minimized Chip Package Size 
And Products Containing Same 
Yes.  Possibly yes.  
337-TA-433  Safety Eyewear and Components 
Thereof 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-436 WAP-Compatible  Wireless 
Communication Devices, 
Components Thereof, And 
Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-438  Plastic Molding Machines With 
Control Systems Having 
Programmable Operator 
Interfaces Incorporating General 
Purpose Computers, And 
Components Thereof 
No. No. 
337-TA-439  HSP Modems, Software and 
Hardware Components Thereof, 
and Products Containing Same 
Yes. No. 
337-TA-441  Field Programmable Gate Arrays 




APPENDIX 4: ITC CASES INVOLVING THE EPROM TEST 





337-TA-541  Power Supply 
Controllers 






Yes.  No.   The Commission 
admits the 
significant value of 
downstream 




hundreds of dollars). 
It also dismisses 
concerns about the 




337-TA-481/491  Display Controllers  Applies to 
downstream LCD 
monitors and circuit 
boards. 
Yes.  Yes.  LCD monitors are 
exclusive of 
televisions. 




Yes.  Yes.  Extends to 
motherboards made 
on or on behalf of 
infringer. 
337-TA-435  Integrated 
Repeaters, Switches 
and Transceivers 
Applies to all circuit 
boards and carriers 
including infringing 
component. 
Yes.  Yes.  The Commission 
disregarded the 
EPROMs factors in 
extending the order 
to circuit boards and 
carriers. 
337-TA-395  EPROMs  Applies to all circuit 
boards containing 
infringing 
component but not 
finished electronics. 
Yes.  Yes.   
337-TA-382  Flash Memory 
Circuits 
Extends to all circuit 
boards and carriers. 










order, however, to 












after import and 
throw away the 
board. 





Yes.  Yes.  Commission notes 
downstream 
motherboard could 
be worth more than 
80 or 90 times as 
 53 
much as the 
infringing 
component. 
337-TA-366  Microsphere 
Adhesive (that is, 
Post-It Notes) 
Applied to portfolios 
and other similar 
products containing 
Post-It Notes.  
Yes.  No.   







Yes.  Yes.  Commission admits 
value of downstream 
product could “far 
exceed” tone dialer 
chips. 
337-TA-334  Condensers in Car 
Air Conditioners 
Applies to air 
conditioner kits but 
not to automobiles. 
Yes.  Yes.  Finds that 
complainant had not 
purchased infringing 
condensers in five 
years, respondent 
had quality control 
systems in place, 
burden would be 
high, and value 
compared to 
finished product is 
very low.  







Yes.  Yes.   
337-TA-276  EPROMs  Applies broadly 





component, but not 
to automobiles. 
Yes.  Yes.  This is the actual 
case formulating the 
nine-prong test. 
Respondent was 
Hyundai. 
 
 
 
 